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I. Introduction
Using drugs meant for individuals with medical needs to carry out
executions is a misguided effort to mask the brutality of executions
by making them look serene and peaceful—like something any one
of us might experience in our final moments.1
So wrote Alex Kozinski, the iconoclastic2 chief judge of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a stinging dissent from that court’s July
2014 denial of a petition for rehearing en banc in the capital punishment
case of Wood v. Ryan.3 The dispute pivoted on the execution of convicted
double-murderer Joseph Rudolph Wood III,4 and it raises the timely and
important constitutional issue at the heart of this article.
Specifically, how much support do three well-established theories of
free expression—namely, the marketplace of ideas,5 democratic selfgovernance6 and self-realization/human dignity7—provide for establishing
a new First Amendment8 right of public access to detailed, factual
information about lethal-injection personnel, procedures, and drugs? Those
theories are significant because the current state of First Amendment
doctrine, particularly under the two-part test from Press-Enterprise Co. v.
Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II)9 for access to government

1. Wood v. Ryan, 759 F.3d 1076, 1102–03 (9th Cir.) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting), vacated,
135 S. Ct. 21 (2014).
2. See Carl Tobias, A New No. 1 at the 9th Circuit, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2007),
http://articles.latimes.com/2007/nov/30/opinion/oe-tobias30 (“[Kozinski] enjoys a well-deserved
reputation as an iconoclast or, some would say, eccentric. Born to Holocaust survivors in
Bucharest, Romania, Kozinski came to the U.S. at 12.”). Kozinski was first appointed to the
Ninth Circuit in 1985. See Kozinski Wins Seat on U.S. Appeals Court in S.F., S.F. CHRON., Nov.
8, 1985, at News 10 ( “[The] Senate confirmed a controversial nominee, Alex Kozinski, to the
U.S. Court of Appeals in San Francisco yesterday[.] Kozinski, 35, will become the youngest
federal appellate judge in the nation. For the past three years, he has been chief judge of the U.S.
Claims Court in Washington, D.C.”).
3. Wood, 759 F.3d 1076.
4. Id. at 1077–78.
5. See infra Part IV, Section A (providing an overview of this theory).
6. See infra Part IV, Section B (providing an overview of this theory).
7. See infra Part IV, Section C (providing an overview of this theory).
8. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” U.S. CONST.
amend. I. The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated ninety years ago through
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause as fundamental liberties to apply to state and
local government entities and officials. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
9. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Sup. Ct. (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1 (1986). This case is
referred to later in this article as Press-Enterprise II in order to distinguish it from the U.S.
Supreme Court’s 1984 ruling in the case of Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501
(1984), which is dubbed Press-Enterprise I. In Press-Enterprise I, the Court held that the voir
dire process in criminal cases is presumptively open. It reasoned, in relevant part, that “[t]he
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proceedings,10 makes finding an access right in cases like that of Joseph
Wood exceedingly difficult.11
Slated to die by lethal injection on July 23, 2014, Wood went to
federal court seeking an injunction stopping his execution until the Arizona
Department of Corrections (ADC) and its director, Charles Ryan, produced
to him the following data:
[T]he source(s), manufacturer(s), National Drug Codes (NDCs),
and lot numbers of the drugs Defendants intend to use in his
execution; non-personally-identifying information detailing the
medical, professional, and controlled-substances qualifications
and certifications of the personnel Defendants intend to use in his
execution; and information and documents detailing the manner in
which Defendants developed their lethal-injection drug protocol.12
Wood argued that the ADC’s and Ryan’s refusal to produce this
information violated a First Amendment “right of access to governmental
proceedings.”13 Wood’s motion, as explained later in more detail,14 was
rejected on July 10, 2014, by U.S. District Judge Neil Wake.15 Just nine
days later, however, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed
Wake’s ruling in a split, two-to-one decision.16 It marked the first
recognition ever by a federal appellate court of a First Amendment right to
know details about the source of execution drugs.17
Two days later, with the clock quickly ticking toward Wood’s
execution, a divided Ninth Circuit denied the ADC’s and Ryan’s petition

presumptive openness of the jury selection process in England, not surprisingly, carried over into
proceedings in colonial America.” Id. at 508.
10. The two parts of this test relate to the “experience and logic” of requiring access. PressEnterprise II, 478 U.S. at 9. These are deemed “complementary considerations.” Id. at 8. The
experience component examines “whether the place and process have historically been open to
the press and general public.” Id. The logic prong, in turn, evaluates “whether public access plays
a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question.” Id.
11. Infra Part III (describing the application of the Press-Enterprise II test in three cases
involving requests for access in 2014 to detailed data about lethal injections).
12. Wood v. Ryan, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94412, at *6 (D. Ariz. July 10, 2014), rev’d, 759
F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2014).
13. Id. at *7.
14. Infra Part III, Section A.
15. Wood v. Ryan, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94412, at *20.
16. Wood, 759 F.3d 1076.
17. See Erik Eckholm, Court Delays Execution Over Secrecy with Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, July
21, 2014, at A11 (quoting Jennifer Moreno of the Death Penalty Clinic at the University of
California, Berkeley, for the proposition that “this is the first time a circuit court has ruled that the
plaintiff has a right to know the source of execution drugs”).
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for a rehearing en banc.18 That refusal prompted Judge Kozinski’s dissent
quoted at the start of this article.19 Kozinski passionately added that
executions “are brutal, savage events, and nothing the state tries to do can
mask that reality. Nor should it. If we as a society want to carry out
executions, we should be willing to face the fact that the state is
committing a horrendous brutality on our behalf.”20 Nonetheless, he
predicted the U.S. Supreme Court would overrule the Ninth Circuit’s
decision and, in turn, allow Wood’s execution to proceed as scheduled.21
Indeed, on July 22, 2014—just one day before Wood’s planned
execution—the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s preliminary
injunction.22 The high court cursorily explained that “[t]he district judge
did not abuse his discretion in denying Wood’s motion for a preliminary
injunction. Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversing the district court and granting a conditional preliminary
injunction vacated.”23
Ultimately, Wood’s death the next day apparently proved every bit as
brutal and excruciating as Chief Judge Kozinski proclaimed executions
inherently are.24 In fact, it took nearly two full hours for Wood to die25—
far longer than the average26 of about nine minutes.27 Furthermore, some
witnesses claimed the procedure “left Wood gasping for air,”28 and
18. Wood, 759 F.3d 1076.
19. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
20. Wood, 759 F.3d at 1103.
21. See id. at 1102 (“I have little doubt that the Supreme Court will thwart this latest attempt
to interfere with the State of Arizona’s efforts to carry out its lawful sentence and bring Wood to
justice for the heinous crimes he committed a quarter century ago.”).
22. Ryan v. Wood, 135 S. Ct. 21 (2014).
23. Id. at 21.
24. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
25. See Matt Pearce et al., Execution Takes Two Hours, L.A. TIMES, July 24, 2014, at AA1
(noting that Wood “received an injection at 1:52 p.m.,” and reporting that the injection procedure
“became so prolonged that reporters witnessing the execution counted several hundred of his
wheezes before he was finally declared dead at 3:49 p.m.—nearly two hours after the procedure
began”).
26. See David Biello, Bad Drugs: Lethal Injection Does Not Work as Designed, SCI. AM.
(Apr. 23, 2007), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/lethal-injection-does-not-work-asdesigned (“In North Carolina inmates took an average of nine minutes to die (and much longer
before flawed drug protocols were changed), and in California cessation of the heartbeat took
from two to eight minutes after the last injection of the heart-stopping potassium chloride.”); Matt
Pearce, I Don’t Think He’s Going to Die, L.A. TIMES, July 25, 2014, at A1 (“Some lethal
injection executions succeed within 10 minutes.”).
27. See Arif Kahn & Robyn M. Leventhal, Medical Aspects of Capital Punishment
Executions, 47 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1, 3 (2002) (noting that lethal injections took an average of 8.4
minutes).
28. Miranda Rivers, Lethal-Injection Drug Registration is Renewed, ARIZ. DAILY STAR
(Tucson), Sept. 7, 2014, at C4.
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“[s]everal reporters on the scene agreed with one of Wood’s lawyers that
Wood was gasping and snorting for more than an hour.”29 The Baltimore
Sun reported that “[i]t took so long for Wood to die after receiving an
injection of midazolam combined with hydromorphone that his attorneys
had time to file an emergency appeal asking officials to save his life as the
drugs apparently failed to fully take hold.”30 In fact, Wood’s lawyers “even
called Justice Anthony M. Kennedy of the United States Supreme Court.”31
Although the ADC vehemently disputed accusations that Wood’s
execution was “botched,”32 the editors of the Los Angeles Times bluntly
opined in its aftermath that “death penalty protocols should not be kept
secret.”33 Gene Policinski, vice president and executive director of the
First Amendment Center, added that although “the First Amendment won’t
settle the controversy over the death penalty,” “the core freedoms it
protects can provide the means for the self-governed to effectively debate
and decide issues facing our nation.”34 Cassandra Stubbs, director of the
American Civil Liberties Union’s Capital Punishment Project, concurred
that “[i]nstead of hiding lethal injection under layers of foolish secrecy,
these states need to show us where the drugs are coming from.”35
29. Bob Egelko, Botched Executions Spark Judge’s Call for Firing Squad, S.F. CHRON.,
July 25, 2014, at A1.
30. Matt Pearce et al., Attorneys File Appeal as Inmate Slowly Dies, BALT. SUN, July 24,
2014, at 7A.
31. Erik Eckholm, Arizona Takes Nearly Two Hours to Execute Inmate, N.Y. TIMES, July
24, 2014, at A1.
32. The Arizona Department of Corrections issued a statement the day after Wood’s death
that asserted, in relevant part, that:
Media reports, some of which were made prior to any information officially
being released on the day of the execution, reached the premature and
erroneous conclusion that this execution was ‘botched’. This is pure
conjecture because there is no medical or forensic evidence to date that
supports that conclusion.
In fact, the evidence gathered thus far supports the opposite. The IV team,
which includes a licensed medical doctor, verified multiple times during the
procedure that the inmate was comatose and never in pain. The record clearly
shows the inmate was fully and deeply sedated beginning at 1:57 PM – three
minutes after the administration of the execution drugs – until he was
declared deceased at 3:49 PM.
Press Release, Arizona Dep’t of Corrections, Department of Corrections Statement on
Review of July 23 Execution (July 24, 2014), https://corrections.az.gov/article/depart
ent-corrections-statement-review-july-23-execution.
33. Editorial, Misery of Mis-Executions, L.A. TIMES, July 25, 2014, at A20.
34. Gene Policinski, Seeking the Ultimate ‘Redress of Grievances,’ TENNESSEAN (Aug.
10, 2014), http://www.tennessean.com/story/opinion/columnists/2014/08/11/seeking-ultimate-re
dress-grievances/13866547.
35. Press Release, ACLU, Arizona Botches Execution, Imposes Cruel and Unusual
Punishment on Joseph Wood (July 23, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/print/capital-punishment/
arizona-botches-execution-imposes-cruel-and-unusual-punishment-joseph-wood.
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The importance of the question of establishing a First Amendment
right of access to the details of death penalty facts and procedures that
Policinski and Stubbs intimate goes well beyond Wood’s case. As the
Washington Post reported, his death occurred “just months after a botched
execution in Oklahoma.”36 In that case, “rather than dying from lethal
injection, Clayton Lockett died of a heart attack 40 minutes after the first of
the drugs had been administered.”37 Indeed, as the New York Times wrote,
“Wood’s execution was the fourth troubled one” in 2014.38
Critically, the Ninth Circuit was not the only appellate court in 2014 to
consider an issue like that in Wood v. Ryan. In June of that year, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Wellons v. Commissioner39
rebuffed the argument of convicted rapist and murderer Marcus A. Wellons
that “the dearth of information regarding the nature of the pentobarbital that
will be used in his execution and the expertise of those who will carry it out
violates the First Amendment.”40 The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the
district court’s conclusion (and the Georgia Department of Corrections’
argument) that “while there may be First Amendment implications
involved in the openness of government operations, the cases Wellons
relies upon turn on the public’s, rather than the individual’s, need to be
informed so as to foster debate.”41
Additionally, the Supreme Court of Georgia, in May 2014 in Owens v.
Hill,42 considered the constitutionality of Georgia’s refusal to reveal
information to convicted murderer Warren Lee Hill, who was sentenced to
death. Hill sought “the names and other identifying information of the
persons and entities involved in executions, including those who
manufacture the drug or drugs to be used.”43 The Georgia high court
rejected Hill’s First Amendment-based access argument, finding “a
longstanding tradition of concealing the identities of those who carry out
those executions.”44 The court reasoned that, in light of privacy concerns
36. Mark Berman, Execution Takes Nearly Two Hours, WASH. POST, July 24, 2014, at A3.
37. Editorial, Horror Stories in the Death Chamber, SUNDAY NEWS (Lancaster, Pa.), July
27, 2014, at P2.
38. Fernanda Santos & John Schwartz, A Prolonged Execution in Arizona Leads to a
Temporary Halt, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/25/us/aprolonged-execution-in-arizona-leads-to-a-temporary-halt.html.
39. 754 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2014).
40. Id. at 1267.
41. Id. at 1266. The appellate court cited the following cases upon which Wellons
apparently relied in his First Amendment argument: Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457
U.S. 596 (1982); Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1 (1986); Cal. First Amendment Coal. v.
Woodford, 299 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002); and Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
42. 758 S.E.2d 794 (Ga.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 449 (2014).
43. Id. at 796.
44. Id. at 805.
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and protecting those involved in performing executions from harassment
and retaliation, keeping secret the names of executioners was justified.45
The court added that while “the executioner who actually inflicts death
upon the prisoner is the most obvious party in need of such protection, we
believe that the same logic applies to the persons and entities involved in
making the preparations for the actual execution, including those involved
in procuring the execution drugs.”46 In November 2014, the U.S. Supreme
Court passed on the opportunity to hear the case.47
All of this judicial jockeying occurs just as “public support for the
death penalty, though still high, has been falling.”48 A Gallup poll
conducted in October 2014 found that 63% of those surveyed favored the
death penalty for individuals convicted of murder—a figure far lower than
the high of 80% in 1994.49 A 2013 survey conducted by the Pew Research
Center found that while 55% of Americans “said they favored the death
penalty for convicted murderers, that was the lowest support level in four
decades; support has been falling for the past two decades.”50
Furthermore, the odds of malfunction during a lethal injection may be
higher today.
That is partly because the American Board of
Anesthesiology now takes the “position that an anesthesiologist should not
participate in an execution by lethal injection and that violation of this
policy is inconsistent with the Professional Standing criteria required for
ABA Certification and Maintenance of Certification in Anesthesiology or
any of its subspecialties.”51 As Professor Deborah Denno explains, the
paradox is that “[t]he people most knowledgeable about the process of
lethal injection—doctors, particularly anesthesiologists—are often reluctant
to impart their insights and skills.”52 In another article, Denno puts it far
more bluntly: “legislatures delegate death to prison personnel and
executioners who are not qualified to devise a lethal-injection protocol,

45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Hill v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 449 (2014).
48. Moshik Temkin, How to Kill the Death Penalty, L.A. TIMES, May 27, 2014, at A13.
49. Death Penalty, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1606/death-penalty.aspx (last
visited Oct. 20, 2015).
50. Drew DiSilver, Botched Execution in Oklahoma Renews Death Penalty Debate, PEW
RESEARCH CTR. (Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/04/30/botchedexecution-in-oklahoma-renews-death-penalty-debate.
51. Commentary, Anesthesiologists and Capital Punishment, AM. BD. OF ANESTHESIOLOGY
(May 2014), http://www.theaba.org/pdf/CapitalPunishmentCommentary.pdf.
52. Deborah W. Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary: How Medicine Has Dismantled the
Death Penalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 53 (2007).
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much less carry one out.”53 Boer Deng and Dahlia Lithwick encapsulated
well this aspect of the problem in Slate in May 2014:
[I]t’s clear that the reason lethal injection has become more
gruesome and violent in recent years is at least partly a result of
opposition to the death penalty. Lethal injection was supposed to
be the humane alternative to firing squads and hangings. But as
American physicians sideline themselves and European
pharmaceutical firms (and American ones with global ties) decline
to supply the most known and efficacious lethal-injection drugs,
corrections officials have been pushed to use inferior methods and
substandard providers.54
Perhaps most significantly, the U.S. Supreme Court in January 2015
granted a petition for a writ of certiorari in Glossip v. Gross.55 There, the
Court will consider a trio of questions related to the constitutionality of
lethal-injection drug protocols and Eighth Amendment56 concerns of cruel
and unusual punishment.57 As the Los Angeles Times put it shortly after the
Court granted certiorari, “[s]ome of the justices have been eager to act after
a year in which three executions in three states had serious problems, with
inmates seeming to suffer while being put to death.”58 Lethal injections are
now squarely caught in both the judicial and public crosshairs.
This article, bridging First Amendment doctrine with theory, examines
whether the First Amendment should provide a right of access for both
death-sentenced defendants and the public to obtain detailed information
regarding the implementation of lethal injections. Part II initially provides
a brief primer on the two-part doctrine typically applied by courts to

53. Deborah W. Denno, When Legislatures Delegate Death: The Troubling Paradox Behind
State Uses of Electrocution and Lethal Injection and What It Says About Us, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 63,
66 (2002).
54. Boer Deng & Dahlia Lithwick, Liberal Guilt: In the Push to Abolish the Capital
Punishment, Opponents of the Death Penalty Have Made It Less Safe, SLATE (May 9, 2014, 5:14
PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/05/death_penalty_in_
america_how_the_push_to_abolish_capital_punishment_has.html.
55. 135 S. Ct. 1173 (Jan. 23, 2015).
56. The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S.
CONST., amend. VIII. The cruel and unusual punishment clause has been incorporated through
the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the states. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–240
(1972).
57. See Questions Presented, Glossip v. Gross, No. 14-7955, SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/14-07955qp.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2015)
(setting forth the three questions in the case).
58. Michael Muskal, Back Story; Reviewing Executions, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2015, at A2.
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determine if the First Amendment provides a qualified right of access to
certain governmental proceedings.59 It also notes how some courts are
stretching this right beyond the confines of courtrooms and judicial
proceedings. Part III then examines how courts in the abovementioned trio
of 2014 cases—Wood, Wellons, and Hill—applied variations of this
doctrine when analyzing the issue of access to facts about lethal-injection
drugs, personnel and procedures.60
Next, Part IV moves beyond the First Amendment doctrinal issues to
the realm of free speech theory from which those doctrines spring.61
Specifically, it explores how three venerable theories of free expression
support expanding the doctrine to include a right to such information.62
Finally, Part V concludes by asserting that the U.S. Supreme Court should
grant certiorari in a future death-by-lethal-injection case and, in turn,
resolve the issue by moving beyond the narrow confines of the PressEnterprise II doctrine63 to recognize that First Amendment theory demands
access to more detailed data regarding lethal injections.64

II. First Amendment Doctrine on Public Access Rights: From
Courtrooms to Executions to Horse Round-Ups
This part initially provides, in Section A, a brief overview of the twopart test the U.S. Supreme Court applies for determining if the public
possesses a First Amendment right of access to certain judicial
proceedings. Section A does so because, as Part III later makes clear, the
courts in the death-by-lethal-injection cases of 2014 all applied some
variation of it. Section B then describes how some courts are willing to
expand a First Amendment right of access beyond courtrooms to other
proceedings, including the right to witness executions.
A.

The Experience and Logic Test

In Press-Enterprise II,65 the U.S. Supreme Court in 1986 fashioned
what Professor Raleigh Hannah Levine describes as a “two-pronged
59. Infra notes 65-136 and accompanying text.
60. Infra notes 137-244 and accompanying text.
61. See Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence,
in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 153, 153 (Lee C. Bollinger &
Geoffrey R. Stone eds. 2002) (“First Amendment doctrine veers between theory and the
exigencies of specific cases. The function of doctrine is both to implement the objectives
attributed by theory to the Constitution and to offer principled grounds of justification for
particular decisions.”).
62. Infra notes 245-279 and accompanying text.
63. Supra text accompanying note 9.
64. Infra notes 280-304 and accompanying text.
65. 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
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experience and logic pre-test as the standard by which to determine
whether a particular criminal proceeding [is] presumptively open.”66 Often
referred to simply as Press-Enterprise II,67 the case centered on whether a
Southern California-based newspaper possessed a First Amendment right
of access to the transcript of a 41-day preliminary hearing in the
prosecution of a man charged with multiple counts of murder.68
In concluding that a “qualified First Amendment right of access to
criminal proceedings applies to preliminary hearings as they are conducted
in California,”69 Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote for the majority that a
qualified right of access exists in light of “two complementary
considerations.”70 Under the first consideration, the Court must consider
“whether the place and process have historically been open to the press and
general public.”71 Under the second factor, the Court evaluates “whether
public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the
particular process in question.”72 Burger noted the nexus between these
two prongs of the test, writing that “these considerations of experience and
logic are, of course, related, for history and experience shape the
functioning of governmental processes.”73
Importantly, satisfying this test only establishes a qualified, rather than
absolute, First Amendment right of access to a judicial proceeding. To
overcome the right and to limit public and press access:
[T]he party seeking to close the hearing must advance an
overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, the closure must
be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, the trial court
must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the hearing, and it
must make findings adequate to support the closure.74
Courts have applied this standard to various types of courtroom
proceedings, including trials involving juvenile defendants.75 For instance,
in United States v. Three Juveniles76 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First
66. Raleigh Hannah Levine, Toward a New Public Access Doctrine, 27 CARDOZO L. REV.
1739, 1755 (2006).
67. See supra note 9 (describing why the case is referred to as Press-Enterprise II).
68. Press-Enterprise II, at 3–5.
69. Id. at 13.
70. Id. at 8.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 9.
74. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984).
75. United States v. Three Juveniles, 61 F.3d 86 (1st Cir. 1995).
76. Id.
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Circuit upheld the district court’s decision to close the proceedings in
accordance with section 5038 of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act77
and the defendants’ request.78 As the First Circuit framed the standard to
overcome the presumption of access in Three Juveniles, “reviewing courts
must determine whether the closure is ‘essential to preserve higher values’
and ‘narrowly tailored to serve that interest.’”79 Despite the “presumption
of openness”80 of voir dire proceedings in criminal cases, the high
“overriding interest”81 standard required by Press-Enterprise I to curtail the
qualified right of access was satisfied by the need to protect “juvenile[s]
from the stigma of a criminal record.”82
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit explained in 2004
that “[t]he burden to overcome a First Amendment right of access rests on
the party seeking to restrict access, and that party must present specific
reasons in support of its position.”83 In particular, the party seeking closure
must prove the existence of a “compelling governmental interest” and that
the order is “narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”84 This mirrors the
rigorous strict scrutiny standard against which the constitutionality of
content-based restrictions on speech are measured.85
In summary, as Professor Cathy Packer writes, “courts now use what
has come to be known as the ‘experience and logic’ test to determine which
judicial proceedings must be open.”86 The seeds of this test and the right of
public access evolved from the Supreme Court’s 1980 decision in
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,87 involving “the right of the public
77. 18 U.S.C. § 5038 (1995).
78. Three Juveniles, 61 F.3d at 92–93.
79. Id. at 88 (citing Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510).
80. Id. (citing Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 508–10).
81. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510.
82. Three Juveniles, 61 F.3d at 88.
83. Va. Dep’t State Police v. Wash. Post, 386 F.3d 567, 575 (4th Cir. 2004).
84. Id.
85. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011) (asserting that
because a California law limiting minors’ access to violent video games “imposes a restriction on
the content of protected speech, it is invalid unless California can demonstrate that it passes strict
scrutiny—that is, unless it is justified by a compelling government interest and is narrowly drawn
to serve that interest”); see also United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000)
(asserting that a content-based speech restriction can only stand judicial review “if it satisfies
strict scrutiny,” opining that “[i]f a statute regulates speech based on its content, it must be
narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government interest,” and adding that “if a less
restrictive alternative would serve the Government’s purpose, the legislature must use that
alternative”).
86. Cathy Packer, Should Courtroom Observers Be Allowed to Use Their Smartphones and
Computers in Court? An Examination of the Arguments, 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 573, 575
(2013).
87. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).

12

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[38:1

and press to attend criminal trials.”88 Today, however, “federal courts of
appeals have widely agreed that it extends to civil proceedings and
associated records and documents.”89
However, Professor Barry McDonald of Pepperdine University points
out that the public right of access “has been relatively dormant at the
Supreme Court level.”90 McDonald attributes that inactivity, in part, to the
“daunting task of determining the scope of such a right.”91 Initially, the
Court appeared to “carefully limit”92 its application to criminal trial
proceedings. Over time, however, many lower courts recognized a right of
access to civil and criminal trials, as well as to records and documents
associated with those trials.93 The Supreme Court’s failure to sufficiently
address the issue has led to mishandlings of the experience and logic test
among the lower courts.
Attorneys Myron Steele and Peter Tslofias assert that implementation
of the experience and logic test by lower courts beyond criminal trial
settings demonstrates a “drastic departure from the United States Supreme
Court’s ‘experience and logic’ jurisprudential standard.”94 Because the
public right to access “is theoretically endless . . . it must be invoked with
discrimination and temperance.”95 Failure to employ such measured
judgment results in lower courts using their own discretion to deem “what
is ‘good,’ ‘desirable,’ or ‘expedient’ as opposed to ‘what is constitutionally
commanded by the First Amendment.’”96
Furthermore, courts subjectively and inconsistently evaluate the
history/experience prong of the test due to the absence of a narrow
definition. For example, the Committee on Communications and Media
Law of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York pointed to
Society of Professional Journalists v. Secretary of Labor,97 an

88. Id. at 558.
89. Courthouse News Serv. v. Planet, 750 F.3d 776, 786 (9th Cir. 2014).
90. Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information: Towards
a Realistic Right to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249, 328 (2004).
91. Id. at 296.
92. Id. (citing Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 8–10 (1986)).
93. Id. at 304. See, e.g., Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 695 n.11 (6th Cir.
2002) (explaining that several circuits have agreed that access to civil trials is presumptively
open); In re Providence Journal Co., 293 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2002) (extending the qualified right
of access to court documents in criminal proceedings).
94. Myron T. Steele & Peter I. Tsoflias, Realigning with the Constitutional Pendulum, 77
ALB. L. REV. 1365, 1382 (2013).
95. Id. at 1381 (citing Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 588 (1980)).
96. Id. at 1381–82.
97. 616 F. Supp. 569 (D. Utah 1985).
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administrative agency hearing.98 Applying the experience and logic test,
“the court found ‘little historical tradition.’”99 Using its discretion, the
court instead opted to examine “‘analogous’ civil trials.”100 Evaluating the
“broad spectrum of administrative hearings, rather than narrow instances,”
produced a tradition of openness.101 Such jurisprudential murkiness makes
it difficult to confidently predict what constitutes a tradition of historical
openness.
B.

Moving the Right Beyond the Courtroom

In a 2013 article, Professor Matthew Bunker describes “a small but
significant body of case law” that illustrates what he calls “the creative
expansion by some lower courts of a First Amendment right of access
originally intended for entry to judicial proceedings and courtrooms into
the much broader arenas of access involving other branches and agencies of
government.”102 This section provides an overview of some of those
judicial reaches beyond the confines of courtrooms. Such judicial
extensions beyond courtrooms are relevant for purposes of this article
because they indicate that some courts may, in fact, be willing to extend
access rights to detailed data requests regarding lethal-injection drugs,
personnel, and procedures.
Significantly, part of this jurisprudence of access expansion relates to
executions. For instance, in 2012 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in Associated Press v. Otter103 declared it “settled law,”104 at least
within that circuit and dating back to a 2002 decision,105 that “the public
enjoys a First Amendment right to view executions from the moment the
condemned is escorted into the execution chamber, including those ‘initial
procedures’ that are inextricably intertwined with the process of putting the
condemned inmate to death.”106 Also in 2012, a federal court in
Pennsylvania applied the experience and logic test to find a public right to
98. Committee on Communications and Media Law of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York, “If It Walks, Talks and Squawks . . .” The First Amendment Right of Access to
Administrative Adjudications: A Position Paper, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 21, 50 (2005)
[hereinafter “Committee on Communications”].
99. Id. (citing Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists, 616 F. Supp. at 575–76).
100. Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists, 616 F. Supp. at 575.
101. Committee on Communications, supra note 98, at 50 (citing Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists,
616 F. Supp. at 575–576).
102. Matthew D. Bunker & Clay Calvert, Could Wild Horses Drag Access Away From
Courtrooms? Expanding First Amendment Rights to New Pastures, 18 COMM. L. & POL’Y 247,
249 (2013).
103. 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 12128 (9th Cir. June 8, 2012).
104. Id. at *1.
105. Cal. First Amendment Coal. v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002).
106. Otter, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 12128, at *1 (quoting Woodford, 299 F.3d at 877).
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witness executions in the Keystone State.107 The court noted that
“permitting the press to witness all phases of the execution contributes to
the proper functioning of the execution process, in part because it allows
the press to contribute to an informed discussion of the Commonwealth’s
lethal-injection procedures.”108
On the other hand and more recently, an Oklahoma federal district
court in December 2014 rejected the arguments of several news media
organizations that there is a First Amendment right “to view and hear the
entire execution process from beginning to end, which they describe[d] as
the time from when the inmate to be executed enters the execution chamber
until he leaves the chamber, dead or alive.”109 In rebuffing this argument,
the court emphasized that the U.S. Supreme Court had never granted a First
Amendment right of access “outside the criminal adjudication process.”110
Additionally, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held in 2004
“that neither the public nor the media has a First Amendment right to
videotape, photograph, or make audio recordings of government
proceedings that are by law open to the public,”111 including executions.
Expansion of First Amendment access rights can be found in a few
settings other than execution chambers and their viewing rooms. For
example, in 2013 a federal district court in Nevada applied the PressEnterprise II test and found that wild horse gathers conducted by the
federal Bureau of Land Management “have historically been and remain
open to the press and general public, and public access plays a significant
positive role in the function of gather activities. As such, the public has a
right of access to gathers upon public lands.”112 The court noted that the
evidence “establishes that public access to gather activities plays an
important role in the function of the gather, namely protecting the interests
of the overpopulated horses and news gathering for the benefit of the
public.”113
In Delaware Coalition for Open Government, Inc. v. Strine,114 the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in 2013 considered whether a
public right of access exists for arbitration proceedings under Delaware’s
state-sponsored arbitration program.115 The appellate court found, after

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Phila. Inquirer v. Wetzel, 906 F. Supp. 2d 362 (M.D. Pa. 2012).
Id. at 371.
Okla. Observer v. Patton, 73 F. Supp. 3d 1318 (W.D. Okla. 2014).
Id. at 1324.
Rice v. Kempker, 374 F.3d 675, 678 (8th Cir. 2004).
Leigh v. Salazar, 954 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1101 (D. Nev. 2013).
Id.
733 F.3d 510 (3d Cir. 2013).
Id. at 512.
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applying the Press-Enterprise II experience and logic test, that the press
and general public had access to both the “place and process” of arbitration
proceedings.116 A major point of contention between the parties in Strine
centered on which “history” under the experience prong was relevant—a
narrow look at “the history of arbitrations”117 or a broad examination of
“the history of civil trials.”118 The Third Circuit ultimately decided that
both required examination.119 In doing so, it determined that:
[T]he right of access to government-sponsored arbitrations is
deeply rooted in the way the judiciary functions in a democratic
society. Our experience inquiry therefore counsels in favor of
granting public access to Delaware’s proceeding because both the
“place and process” of Delaware’s proceeding “have historically
been open to the press and general public.”120
Furthermore, the Third Circuit reasoned that permitting access helps
to “ensure accountability and allow the public to maintain faith in the
Delaware judicial system,”121 overshadowing the “comparatively less
weighty”122 potential harms of disclosure. In March 2014, the U.S.
Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari in Strine,123 thus
leaving the Third Circuit’s decision intact.
In Cal-Almond, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Agriculture,124 the Ninth
Circuit applied the experience and logic test to decide if Cal-Almond could
access a list of almond growers eligible to vote in a referendum on the
continuation of a marketing order.125 By finding a history of state statutes
explicitly allowing such access126 and concluding that public access would
“play a significant positive role in the functioning of any referendum,
including this one,”127 the appellate court held that Cal-Almond satisfied
the test.128 While the court ruled in favor of Cal-Almond, “the Ninth
Circuit did not fully reach the merits of the constitutional access
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 518 (citing Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986)).
Id. at 515.
Id.
Id. at 516.
Id. at 518.
Id.
Id.
Strine v. Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, 134 S. Ct. 1551 (2014).
960 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 106–07.
Id. at 109.
Id.
Id. at 110.
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question”129 as the constitutional avoidance doctrine resulted in the court
“interpreting a federal statute to allow access”130 instead.
Administrative proceedings also have seen right to access claims,
relying on the experience and logic test for evaluation.131 As Professor
Levine notes, judicial treatment of these claims is “inconsistent and
contradictory.”132 Cases with similar facts have produced split decisions,
with some courts finding the test satisfied and others finding it unmet.133
Furthermore, some courts have opined that the experience and logic test
“should not be applied to administrative proceedings at all.”134 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, for instance, has suggested that
applying the test outside the context “of criminal court proceedings is
‘questionable.’”135 Additionally, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit has expressed doubts about “whether the access right can attach
outside the limited context of historically-open court proceedings.”136
Although the right to access, viewed through the lens of the experience and
logic test, is expanding, it is obvious that the understanding of just how far
it reaches and where it can be applied is muddled at best.
In summary, some courts have expanded the right of access beyond
the narrow confines of courtrooms, ensuring openness where it historically
has resided and rationally belongs. The willingness to expand access in
such cases, particularly the Ninth Circuit rulings involving access to
executions, bodes well for those now seeking to stretch a First Amendment
right of access to encompass data about lethal-injection drugs, procedures,
and personnel. The next part of this article thus examines three cases from
2014 involving that precise issue.

III. The Lethal-Injection Access Cases of 2014: Different
Applications of the Press-Enterprise II Test
This part features three sections, each of which examines one of the
three cases from 2014 involving a request by a death-sentenced inmate for
access to detailed information about his scheduled execution by lethal
injection. In only one of these cases—namely, the Ninth Circuit’s decision
in Wood v. Ryan—did a court recognize a First Amendment-based right of
access to such data. More analysis is devoted below to Wood.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Bunker & Calvert, supra note 102, at 254.
Id.
Levine, supra note 66.
Id. at 1759.
Id.
Id. at 1770.
Calder v. IRS, 890 F.2d 781, 783 (5th Cir. 1989).
Levine, supra note 66, at 1770.
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137

As noted in the Introduction, Wood centered on a First Amendmentbased access request by double-murderer Joseph Rudolph Wood III for
information relating to the drugs and procedures that would be used in his
Specifically, Wood
then-pending execution by lethal injection.138
requested data such as the names of manufacturers and lot numbers of the
drugs by which the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) planned to
kill him, as well as the medical credentials and qualifications of the
individuals who would administer his execution.139
At the trial court level, U.S. District Judge Neil Wake readily and
initially acknowledged two key facts: The existence of “a First Amendment
right of public access to governmental proceedings”140 and the Ninth
Circuit’s recognition in California First Amendment Coalition v.
Woodford141 that the public has a “First Amendment right to view
executions from the moment the condemned is escorted into the execution
chamber.”142
To analyze Wood’s request, Judge Wake then applied the two-part
experience and logic test, which is described in greater detail in Part II,
Section A, for access to governmental proceedings.143 Under this doctrine,
courts consider both if there is a history and tradition of openness to the
proceeding or information and “whether public access plays a significant
positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question.”144
Judge Wake found that Wood offered “no authority for the proposition
that the press and general public have historically been granted access to
information identifying the manufacturer of lethal-injection drugs.”145 The
judge also rejected Wood’s contention “that information identifying the
manufacturer of the lethal-injection drugs is necessary to the public debate
about the death penalty.”146 Wake reasoned here that the ADC already had
disclosed to Wood the “type of drug, the dosage to be used, and the
137. 759 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir.), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 21 (2014).
138. Supra notes 3 and 4, 12-31 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (setting forth the precise data sought by
Wood).
140. Wood v. Ryan, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94412, at *9 (D. Ariz. July 10, 2014), rev’d, 759
F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2014).
141. 299 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002).
142. Id. at 870–871.
143. The test is sometimes referred to as the history and logic test. See generally Mary-Rose
Papandrea, Under Attack: The Public’s Right to Know and the War on Terror, 25 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 35, 46–47 (2005) (providing a brief overview of the history-and-logic test).
144. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).
145. Wood v. Ryan, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94412, at *15.
146. Id. at *15–16.
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expiration dates, as well as the fact that the drugs are domestically-obtained
and FDA-approved.”147 Judge Wake refused to stretch the Ninth Circuit’s
ruling in Woodford to the case at bar, reasoning that Woodford “specifically
addressed a public right to view the execution process. That principle does
not expand to encompass a First Amendment right to compel the
government to disclose information about execution drugs beyond that
already provided here.”148
This reasoning is important because it reveals a dichotomy in Judge
Wake’s logic—specifically, one between witnessing/viewing a process or
proceeding, on the one hand, and obtaining/possessing data about the inner
workings of that process or proceeding, on the other hand. Put slightly
differently, Wake’s analysis suggests a crucial difference between
observation of a government-performed, government-sanctioned event and
possessing government-held data about that same event.
Nine days after Wake denied Wood’s motion for a preliminary
injunction, however, the Ninth Circuit reversed that decision.149 In doing
so, the two-judge majority applied the same two-part Press-Enterprise II
test150 to decide if Wood had raised the requisite “serious questions going
to the merits of his First Amendment claim”151 needed to obtain a
preliminary injunction.
Critically, on the first prong of the Press-Enterprise II standard, the
Ninth Circuit majority chose not to focus narrowly on whether there was a
history of data access to lethal-injection procedures.152 Instead, it initially
focused much more broadly “on the historic openness of the execution
itself.”153 It reasoned here that the data sought by Wood was “inextricably
intertwined with the execution.”154 In other words, the majority seemed to
reject Judge Wake’s bright-line distinction described immediately above
between observing proceedings (executions, in this case) and accessing
information related to those same proceedings.155 The Wood majority
quickly concluded, after taking note of long-standing access to executions
when they historically were performed in public squares during the middle
147. Id. at *16.
148. Id. at *16–17.
149. Wood v. Ryan, 759 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir.), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 21 (2014).
150. Id. at 1082–83.
151. Id. at 1080.
152. This contrasts directly with Judge Wake’s focus at the trial court level, where he found
“no authority for the proposition that the press and general public have historically been granted
access to information identifying of the manufacturer of lethal-injection drugs.” Wood v. Ryan,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94412, at *15 (emphasis added).
153. Wood, 759 F.3d at 1083.
154. Id.
155. Supra note 148 and accompanying text.
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of the day, that “the broad tradition of a public right of access to executions
is indisputable.”156
The Ninth Circuit then dug deeper on the first prong of PressEnterprise II, delving into the historical question of access to data and
information regarding executions generally—not simply those involving
lethal injections. Here, it concluded that “important details about early
methods of executions were also public,”157 finding that “public accounts in
some states supplied information about both the types of ropes used in
hangings and the manufacturers who provided them.”158 The Wood
majority reasoned that, historically, “[n]ewspapers reported openly on gas
chambers, describing their size, cost, and makeup.”159
Ultimately, the majority ruled for Wood on the first prong of the
Press-Enterprise II test, concluding:
[Wood] provided evidence that executions in general have long
been open to the public, and that information regarding the
methods of execution and the qualifications of the executioners
have been open as well. This evidence, at a minimum, raises
“serious questions” as to the historical right of access to the
information Wood seeks.160
The italicized parts of the above-quoted passage make it evident that
the majority focused broadly on executions in general, rather than narrowly
on lethal-injection executions. This clearly helped Wood, given the
relative recency of lethal-injection executions in the United States. It was
not, in fact, until 1977 that “Oklahoma pioneered the first lethal-injection
protocol.”161 The Sooner State’s three-drug protocol—“thiopental, an
ultra-short-acting barbiturate anesthetic; pancuronium bromide, a paralytic
inhibiting muscle movement; and potassium chloride, which induces
cardiac arrest”162—later was adopted during the 1980s and 1990s by thirtyseven states.163 Lethal injection now is the most common method of
execution, with one law journal article noting that it was used “in 929 of

156. Wood, 759 F.3d at 1083.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1084 (emphasis added).
161. Seema Shah, How Lethal Injection Reform Constitutes Impermissible Research on
Prisoners, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1101, 1103 (2008).
162. Eric Berger, Lethal Injection Secrecy and Eighth Amendment Due Process, 55 B.C. L.
REV. 1367, 1376 (2014).
163. Id.
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the 1099 executions in the United States from the re-establishment of the
death penalty in 1976 to March 8, 2008.”164
Turning to the second prong of the Press-Enterprise II test, the
majority found that Wood “raised serious questions as to the positive role
public access to the information he seeks would play in executions.”165 The
court highlighted what it called “a seismic shift in the lethal-injection world
in the last five years, as states have struggled to obtain the drug
traditionally used in executions, thiopental.”166 Additionally, it pointed out
that several flawed executions in 2014 “sparked public curiosity and debate
over the types—and quality—of drugs that should be used in lethal
injections.”167 The Wood majority clearly embraced what might be
considered a “the-more-information-the-better” approach when it comes to
data and details about drugs, drug companies, and executioners.168 It thus
also ruled in favor of Wood on the second prong of the Press-Enterprise II
standard, concluding he “raised serious questions on the merits as to the
positive role that access to lethal-injection drug information and
executioner qualifications will have in the public debate on methods of
execution.”169
In dissent, Judge Jay Bybee drew the same proceedings-versus-data
dichotomy suggested at the district court level by Judge Wake and
addressed earlier in this article.170 Specifically, Judge Bybee wrote that
“[t]he fundamental flaw in Wood’s request for a preliminary injunction is
that Wood does not actually assert a right of access to a governmental
proceeding. The Supreme Court has long held that the First Amendment
does not provide a general right to information in the government’s

164. Teresa A. Zimmers & Leonidas G. Koniaris, Peer-Reviewed Studies Identifying
Problems in the Design and Implementation of Lethal Injection for Execution, 35 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 919, 920 (2008).
165. Wood, 759 F.3d at 1085.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. This is illustrated by the following statement from the Wood majority:
[M]ore information about the drugs used in lethal injections can help an alert
public make better informed decisions about the changing standards of
decency in this country surrounding lethal injection. Knowing the source and
manufacturer of the drugs, along with the lot numbers and NDCs, allows the
public to discern whether state corrections departments are using safe and
reliable drug manufacturers. Similarly, knowing the specific qualifications of
those who will perform the execution will give the public more confidence
than a state’s generic assurance that executions will be administered safely
and pursuant to certain qualifications and standards.
Id. at 1085–86.
169. Id. at 1086.
170. Supra note 148 and accompanying text.
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possession.”171 Judge Bybee elaborated on this line of logic, explaining
that:
Wood does not seek access to a criminal proceeding, nor does
he seek documents filed in a proceeding or transcripts of the
proceeding. Instead, he wants information in the government’s
possession; effectively, he has taken the general right of the public
to view executions and turned it into a FOIA [Freedom of
Information Act] request for documents related to the
execution.172
Thus far, the analyses of Wood at both the district and appellate court
levels suggest there are two major doctrinal sticking points for finding a
First Amendment right of access—be it a public right or a personal right—
to detailed data regarding drugs, procedures, and persons involved in lethal
injections.
First, there is a problem on the history/experience prong of PressEnterprise II regarding whether courts should look narrowly at the history
of access to lethal injections (a procedure in place in the United States only
since 1977) or more broadly at the history of access to executions
generally, regardless of their mode.
Second, there is a question regarding whether the dichotomy between
access to proceedings/events and access to data/information referred to and
recognized by Judge Bybee in his dissent,173 but rejected by the majority, is
a valid one. Compounding this second problem is the fact that where
courts have recognized the existence of a First Amendment right of access
to documents, it exists only in “judicial records,”174 which seemingly would
not include records formulated by the ADC and requested in Wood.
Two days after the Ninth Circuit granted Wood’s motion for a
preliminary injunction, it denied a petition for rehearing en banc.175 That
denial sparked Chief Judge Alex Kozinski’s dissent quoted at the start of
this article.176 Although siding with Judge Bybee’s dissent in the Ninth
Circuit’s earlier ruling, Kozinski wrote to express the view that “[a]
tremendous number of taxpayer dollars have gone into defending a
procedure that is inherently flawed and ultimately doomed to failure. If the
171. Wood, 759 F.3d at 1092 (Bybee, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 1093 (Bybee, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
173. Supra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.
174. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), 707 F.3d
283, 290 (4th Cir. 2013).
175. Wood, 759 F.3d 1076.
176. Id. at 1102–03 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting).
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state wishes to continue carrying out executions, it would be better to own
up that using drugs is a mistake and come up with something that will
work, instead.”177
The next day, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s
preliminary injunction, holding simply that Judge Wake “did not abuse his
discretion in denying Wood’s motion for a preliminary injunction.”178 The
Court thus never wrestled (at least in published written form) in any depth
whatsoever with Wood’s First Amendment access arguments. As noted in
the Introduction, Wood proceeded to die an agonizingly painful death
shortly thereafter.179
B.

Wellons v. Commissioner

180

In July 2014—the same month the Ninth Circuit decided Wood v.
Ryan—the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the
First Amendment did not provide Marcus Wellons with an unbridled right
to information about the drugs or personnel involved in his impending
lethal injection.181 In Wellons v. Commissioner, the Georgia Department of
Corrections (“GDC”) scheduled Wellons for execution by lethal injection
for June 2014.182
One year earlier, Georgia had passed the Lethal Injection Secrecy Act
(“Secrecy Act”),183 which classifies all “identifying information”184 about
the people or entities involved in the manufacture or administration of
drugs used in lethal injections as a “confidential state secret.”185 Georgia,
in fact, “is among a number of states that recently passed so-called secrecy
laws in an effort to maintain access to lethal-injection drugs, particularly
after many drug companies, fearing political backlash, declined to sell
them.”186 In accord with the Secrecy Act, the GDC thus only provided
Wellons with a copy of the lethal-injection procedure, which called for a
one-drug injection protocol of pentobarbital.187

177. Id. at 1103.
178. Ryan v. Wood, 135 S. Ct. 21 (2014).
179. Supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
180. 754 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2838 (2014).
181. Id. at 1267.
182. Id. at 1262.
183. O.C.G.A. § 42-5-36(d) (2013).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Richard Fausset, U.S. Judge Denies Stay of Execution in Georgia, N.Y. TIMES, June 17,
2014, at A13.
187. Wellons, 754 F.3d at 1262.
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Wellons challenged the Secrecy Act on two main constitutional
grounds—the Eighth and First Amendments.188 First, Wellons argued that
the Eighth Amendment gave him the right to information that would help
him ascertain whether the use of pentobarbital is, per the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition, “cruel and unusual.”189 Because the GDC had
not possessed any FDA-approved pentobarbital for more than a year,
Wellons reasonably feared the GDC would inject him with a substance that
it “purports to be pentobarbital, but that has been manufactured from
unknown ingredients and in unknown circumstances by a compounding
pharmacy.”190 The use of this unknown drug would pose an “unacceptable
risk of pain, suffering, and harm”191 because compounding pharmacies are
not subject to FDA regulation, Wellons averred.192
The appellate court reasoned that for Wellons to prevail on his Eighth
Amendment claim, he needed to prove that the use of this substance would
be “‘sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering.’”193
The court rejected Wellons’ Eighth Amendment challenge as mere
speculation.194
Next, Wellons argued that the First Amendment afforded him the right
to details about pentobarbital and its manufacturer because a lethal
injection is a “governmental proceeding.”195 Here, he relied on the PressEnterprise II history/experience and logic test, arguing that, historically and
prior to the adoption of the Secrecy Act, the GDC would have provided
both him and the public with “detailed information about the drugs used in

188. Id. at 1264–67. Wellons also challenged the statute under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, which the court did not discuss at length. Id.
189. Id. at 1264.
190. Id. at 1262.
191. Id. at 1264.
192. Id. According to the FDA’s website, “compounding” is the process of combining two or
more drugs to create a new medication. Compounding and the FDA: Questions and Answers,
FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/PharmacyCom
pounding/ucm339764.htm#what (last visited Mar. 18, 2015). This process is overseen by a
licensed medical professional, but compounded drugs are not approved by the FDA. Id. Instead,
state boards of pharmacy have authority over compounding pharmacies. Id. The FDA warns that
drugs “made using poor quality practices may be sub- or super-potent, contaminated, or otherwise
adulterated.” Id.
193. Wellons, 754 F.3d at 1265 (quoting Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 50 (2008)) (emphasis in
original). In Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008), a fractured Supreme Court rejected an Eighth
Amendment challenge to Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol. Id. at 63. In doing so, it cited
“today’s consensus” that lethal injection was the most humane way of conducting an execution.
Id. at 62.
194. Wellons, 754 F.3d at 1265 (citing Mann v. Palmer, 713 F.3d 1306, 1315 (11th Cir.
2013)).
195. Id. at 1266.
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executions.”196 On the logic prong, Wellons insisted “an informed public
debate is critical in determining ‘whether execution by lethal injection
comports with the evolving standards of decency which mark the progress
of a maturing society.’”197
The court summarily rejected this argument as well, holding instead
that “neither the Fifth, Fourteenth, or First Amendments afford Wellons the
broad right ‘to know where, how, and by whom the lethal-injection drugs
will be manufactured,’ as well as ‘the qualifications of the person or
persons who will manufacture the drugs, and who will place the
catheters.’”198
Although the Wellons per curiam opinion did not discuss the overlap
between the Eighth and First Amendment challenges, concurring Judge
Charles Wilson highlighted the GDC’s hypocrisy and Catch-22 nature of
Wellons’ predicament:
I write separately to highlight the disturbing circularity problem
created by Georgia’s secrecy law regarding the methods of
execution in light of our circuit precedent . . . [Wellons] must
show that the manner in which Georgia intends to execute him
generates “a substantial risk of serious harm”199 . . . Possibly due
to his lack of information about the compound pentobarbital that
will be used and the expertise of the people who will administer
his execution, Wellons has not shown such a risk. Indeed, how
could he when the state has passed a law prohibiting him from
learning about the compound it plans to use to execute him?200
Wilson agreed that Wellons fell short of his Eighth Amendment
burden of proof, but feared the consequences of the GDC’s need to
withhold information from inmates, the public, and even the courts,
“especially given the recent much publicized botched execution in
Oklahoma.”201 Wilson urged that access to information about lethalinjection protocol is necessary for courts to carry out their constitutional
role of determining whether an execution violates the Eighth Amendment
“before it becomes too late.”202

196.
197.
2002).
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id.
Id. (quoting Cal. First Amendment Coal. v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 868, 876 (9th Cir.
Wellons, 754 F.3d at 1267.
Id. (quoting Baze, 553 U.S. at 51).
Id. at 1267–68.
Id. at 1268.
Id.
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The same day the Eleventh Circuit rejected Wellons’ First and Eighth
Amendment arguments, the U.S. Supreme Court denied Wellons’ twin
requests to stay his execution and for a writ of certiorari.203 He was killed
shortly thereafter, marking what the Washington Post noted was “the
nation’s first execution since a botched lethal injection in Oklahoma in
April.”204
C.

Owens v. Hill

205

Like the Eleventh Circuit in Wellons, the Supreme Court of Georgia in
Hill upheld Georgia’s Lethal Injection Secrecy Act,206 in part because of a
long history and tradition of concealing the identities of execution
participants for their protection.207 Warren Lee Hill, an inmate at the Lee
County Correctional Institute, faced death by lethal injection for murdering
another inmate.208 A county judge sentenced Hill to death in an order
issued only two days after the effective date of the Secrecy Act.209
Georgia thus only informed Hill that the drug used in his execution
would be produced by a compounding pharmacy.210 Hill sued, seeking
access to sealed information about the “identity of the compounding
pharmacy and the supply chain and manufacturer(s) of any and all
ingredients used to produce the lethal drug compound”211 that would be
used in his injection.212 He brought constitutional claims under both the
First and Eighth Amendments.213
Citing Baze v. Rees,214 the Georgia high court explained that, to
establish a viable Eighth Amendment claim, Hill needed to prove an
“objectively intolerable risk of harm”215 resulting from the use of the

203. Wellons v. Owens, 134 S. Ct. 2838 (2014).
204. Georgia Inmate Is First To Be Executed After Botched Lethal Injection, WASH. POST
(June 18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/major-child-porn-distributor-sent
enced-to-30-years/2014/06/17/570b3efc-f65e-11e3-8aa9-dad2ec039789_story.html.
205. 295 Ga. 302 (Ga. 2014).
206. O.C.G.A. § 42-5-36 (2013).
207. Owens, 295 Ga. at 316, 318.
208. Id. at 302.
209. Id. at 303. The Secrecy Act took effect on July 1, 2013 and the sentencing court issued
the order on July 3, 2013. It set Hill’s execution for the week of July 13, 2013, effectively giving
Hill only ten days to challenge the new law. See Andrew Cohen, New ‘Injection Secrecy’ Law
Threatens First Amendment Rights in Georgia, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (July 17, 2013),
http://www.cjr.org/behind_the_news/georgia_lethal_injections_shie.php.
210. Owens, 295 Ga. at 319.
211. Id. at 303
212. Id.
213. Id. at 304, 315.
214. 553 U.S. 35 (2008).
215. Owens, 295 Ga. at 309.
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compound drug.216 To meet this high threshold of proof, Hill’s expert
witness testified that drugs made in compounding pharmacies “are of less
reliable quality”217 than those produced by manufacturers subject to FDA
regulation.218 The expert estimated that thirty-four percent of the products
labeled by the pharmacies as “sterile” were actually contaminated, but he
admitted difficulty in knowing what percentage of compounded drugs are
unsafe.219 Side effects from unsterile drugs include sudden drops in blood
pressure, seizures, intravenous pain, pulmonary embolism, and death.220
The Georgia Supreme Court was not persuaded. It held that because
prisoners become unconscious from an overdose of anesthetic before the
lethal drug is injected, “the prisoner will never have an opportunity to
suffer the negative medical effects . . . from a possibly non-sterile drug.”221
It even opined that while contaminated drugs may have fatal side effects,
“such a side effect obviously would be shockingly undesirable in the
practice of medicine, but it is certainly not a worry in an execution.”222
Thus, the court ruled that Hill failed to state a colorable Eighth Amendment
claim because his expert “gave no clear indication regarding the level of
risk involved.”223 The court then weighed this lack of evidence against the
fact that pentobarbital is a common drug produced in a facility that
manufactures “millions of prescriptions per year.”224
The lower court in Hill held that the Secrecy Act violated the First
Amendment because it denied Hill access to information and to
government proceedings.225 In reversing this decision, the Georgia
Supreme Court distinguished the “freedom to disseminate information
already within one’s own possession”226 with what it believed to be the
issue in Hill’s case, namely Georgia’s “refusal to disclose information
within its control.”227 Based on this distinction, the court interpreted Hill’s
argument as little more than bootstrapping a Freedom of Information Act

216. Id. at 309–10.
217. Id. at 310.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 311.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. (citing Sells v. Livingston, 561 F. App’x 342 (5th Cir. 2014)). Next, Hill argued that
the Secrecy Act violates his due process right to access to the courts. In response, the court found
that “losing in court is not the same as being denied access to the courts.” Id. at 313–14. It
reasoned that Hill’s access claim is “belied by the proceedings below and the instant appeal.” Id.
225. Id. at 315.
226. Id. (emphasis in original).
227. Id. at 315 (emphasis in original).
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request to the First Amendment. As the court reasoned, Hill could not
“turn the First Amendment into an Open Records Act for information
relating to executions.”228
Similarly, the court rejected Hill’s argument that he was denied access
to a historically open government proceeding.229 Georgia’s high court
applied the history/experience and logic test from Press-Enterprise II and
ruled that Hill failed to satisfy both prongs.230 First, the court explained
that, although public access to executions has been mostly open,
“‘historically, executioners have hidden behind a hood—both literally and
figuratively.’”231 Second, the court held that public access to lethal
injections—and by analogy, access to information about the processes—
would play a negative role in the functioning of executions.232
It relied on the importance of privacy to justify its conclusion under
both prongs,233 holding that “[a]lthough many governmental processes
operate best under public scrutiny, it takes little imagination to recognize
that there are some kinds of government operations that would be totally
frustrated if conducted openly.”234 It also noted that maintaining the
privacy of the drug manufacturers and executioners would protect those
companies and individuals from harassment or retaliation by inmates and
members of the public who oppose lethal injection.235 This, in turn, avoids
the risk that drug manufacturers and executioners may, due to fear of
reprisal, grow unwilling to perform their duties.236
Dissenting, Justice Robert Benham recalled the gruesome and gory
details of Oklahoma inmate Clayton Lockett’s lethal injection, in which his
“veins failed, he reportedly twitched and mumbled, even after having been
declared unconscious, and, although officials attempted to halt the
execution, Lockett died forty-three minutes after the first drug had been
administered.”237 Worst of all, Justice Benham noted, the cause of this
botched execution remains unknown.238 Benham feared Georgia was “on a
path that, at the very least, denies Hill and other death row inmates the

228. Id. at 316.
229. Id. at 317–18.
230. Id. at 316.
231. Id. (quoting Ellyde Roko, Executioner Identites: Toward Recognizing a Right to Know
Who Is Hiding Beneath the Hood, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2791, 2829 (2007)).
232. Id. at 317.
233. Id. at 316–317.
234. Id. at 316 (quoting Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 10–12).
235. Id.
236. Id. at 317.
237. Id. at 318.
238. Id.
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rights to due process and, at the very worst, leads to the macabre results
that occurred in Oklahoma.”239
Benham rejected the majority’s privacy rationales, reasoning they did
not justify forgoing “constitutional processes in favor of secrecy, especially
when the state is carrying out the ultimate punishment.”240 Like Judge
Charles Wilson, who concurred in Wellons, Justice Benham criticized the
majority for its hypocrisy, stating that “the speculation permeating Hill’s
claims arises solely from the State’s unwillingness, in light of the secrecy
statute, to disclose information that would allow him to make more specific
claims.”241 Benham belittled, if not scoffed at, the fact that Georgia
promised Hill the drugs used in his execution would be safe.242 He claimed
“these assurances amount to little more than hollow invocations of ‘trust
us.’”243
Proposing a compromise, Justice Benham suggested a solution that
would foster the First Amendment and protect participants:
I would grant [Hill] access to information identifying the
compounding pharmacy that produces his execution drug;
although, I would direct that the information be released under
appropriate safeguards to minimize any harm to individuals who
are simply performing their jobs. Likewise, because learning the
source of the bulk materials used by the compounding pharmacy
could lead to information supporting Hill’s cruel and unusual
punishment claim, I would also order that information disclosed to
Hill.244
Thus, Justice Benham echoed a key argument in this article—that the
First Amendment demands that the public and inmates have access to
information about lethal injections, and that this access will not unduly
disrupt the sensitive process.
In summary, with the exception of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Wood,
which the U.S. Supreme Court quickly tossed out, the Press-Enterprise II
doctrine failed to provide access to the inmates in Wood, Wellons, and Hill.
Because doctrinal support for a First Amendment right of access to detailed
information about lethal injections is weak at best, Part IV next addresses a

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Id.
Id. at 319.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 320.
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trio of First Amendment theories that, conversely, supports access to
detailed data regarding lethal-injection drugs, personnel, and procedures.

IV. A First Amendment Theory Perspective: Moving Beyond the
Realm of Dated Doctrine to Examine a Modern Controversy
This part explores how three time-honored theories of freedom of
expression, although each being subject to scholarly criticism,245 support
expanding a judicially created First Amendment right of access to certain
governmental proceedings to also encompass requests for detailed factual
information about lethal injections involving specific death-sentenced
inmates.
A.

Marketplace of Ideas

What is the truth, as it were, about lethal-injection executions as they
are now carried out in the United States? Are they really more humane or
painless today than other forms of state-sponsored executions?246 Are the
drug-based cocktails served up in some states of sufficient formula and
strength to ensure speedy deaths? Are the people, in turn, who mix and
administer those drugs—morbidity mixologists, as it were—adequately
trained to do so properly and effectively? The marketplace of ideas theory,
as described below, demands public access to all state-possessed
information that could lead to truthful answers about such important lifeand-death questions.
The marketplace theory247 is, as First Amendment scholar Rodney
Smolla writes, “perhaps the most powerful metaphor in the free speech
tradition.”248 At the heart of this theory, Professor Daniel Solove asserts, is
the notion that free speech “contributes to the promotion of truth.”249 An
open marketplace of ideas is valuable both because it allows the public to

245. See Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and Good Character: From Milton to Brandeis to the
Present, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 61, 62 (Lee C. Bollinger
& Geoffrey R. Stone eds. 2002) (referring to these three theories as a “tired trilogy of
conventional free-speech justifications” that are “at worst so abstract and protean as to be of
limited intellectual or practical utility”).
246. The lethal injection “method was initially introduced precisely because it was supposed
to be more humane than the electric chair or the gallows.” Serge Schmemann, Celebrating
Sainthood and Witnessing Barbarity, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2014, at Sunday Review 2.
247. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 75–118 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin
Books 1974) (1859). The origin of the marketplace of ideas theory can be traced back to John
Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, as Mill discussed the benefits of liberty. The theory was not named, but
the exact logic for free thought and discussion was. Id.
248. Rodney A. Smolla, Free Speech in an Open Society 6 (1992).
249. Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against
Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 998 (2003).
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try to attain a truth250 and because it involves the never-ending process of
seeking and testing supposed truths.251
The marketplace theory thus provides a conceptual model for freedom
of expression within a collective society, with the goal of “advanc[ing]
human understanding about the nature of the world and the best way to live
within it.”252 As John Stuart Mill wrote in On Liberty, “[a]ll silencing of
discussion is an assumption of infallibility.”253 Rather than silence
discussion, Mill posited that:
[T]he only way in which a human being can approach to
knowing the whole of a subject is by hearing what can be
said about it by persons of every variation of opinion, and
studying all the modes in which it can be looked at by every
character of mind.254
“[O]nly through diversity of opinion,” Mill averred, “is there, in the
existing state of human intellect, a chance of fair play to all sides of the
truth.”255 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., as Professor Stanley Ingber
writes, is credited with introducing the marketplace of ideas “concept into
American jurisprudence in his 1919 dissent to Abrams v. United States.”256
In Abrams, Holmes argued that “the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.”257 Nearly a
full century later, Justice Anthony Kennedy reaffirmed this maxim and the
power of the marketplace metaphor in United States v. Alvarez,258 writing
for the plurality that “[t]he theory of our Constitution is ‘that the best test of

250. The attainment of a political truth as a valuable result of the marketplace of ideas was
espoused by Justice Louis Brandeis in his concurrence in Whitney v. California, in which
Brandeis suggested that truth could be ascertained through the “power of reason as applied
through public discussion.” 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
251. The value implicit in the process of truth seeking was advocated by Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. in his dissent in Abrams v. United States, in which Holmes argued that “the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market.” 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
252. Steven G. Gey, The First Amendment and the Dissemination of Socially Worthless
Untruths, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 9 (2008).
253. MILL, supra note 247, at 77.
254. Id. at 80.
255. Id. at 111.
256. Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 3
(1984).
257. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
258. 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
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truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market.’”259
The subjective and normative nature of ethical and political debates
like those surrounding the death penalty and lethal-injection procedures are
highly contestable, in part because society needs a higher order of
judgments based on perceptions of reality and human nature to resolve
them.260 Just as the way the news media frame an issue affects how the
public perceives it,261 a lack of information and knowledge about an issue
can equally distort reality.262 Thus, the public requires knowledge of facts,
procedures, ideas, and perspectives to reach a proper resolution in such
ethical and political matters.
The marketplace of ideas suffers without a steady influx of
information. Detailed data about the drugs, personnel, and procedures used
in lethal injections is necessary for the public to engage in robust, accurate,
and fair discussions about the validity and vitality of the death penalty.
Furthermore, this vigorous debate is necessary for the public to reach a fair
political consensus about the procedures involved in carrying out a death
sentence. The nature of normative topics, especially sensitive ones like
lethal injections, is that there are a variety of viewpoints. The marketplace
of ideas theory strives to include all viewpoints so that the public can reach
the fairest consensus about even the most sensitive issues. The theory thus
demands that the public, as well as the condemned, receive as much
information as possible to decide the truth about the state of lethal
injections in the United States today.
If the issue is framed as whether lethal injections provide a humane
and painless way of killing a person, then knowing as much information as
possible about how they are carried out (and who carries them out) can help
the public and lawmakers to understand if it is, indeed, true that they are
humane and painless. Similarly, if the issue is posed as whether death by
lethal injection today in the United States constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment, then also knowing as much
information as possible about how such injections occur can help the U.S.
Supreme Court to reach its own truth about that question. In brief, the
marketplace theory strongly militates in favor of providing the public with
access to as many facts and details as possible regarding the
implementation of lethal injections. The “truth” about lethal injections
demands access to factual information that affects them.
259. Id. at 2550 (quoting Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
260. Gey, supra note 252, at 8.
261. C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 15 (1989).
262. Paul R. Brewer & Kimberly Gross, Values, Framing, and Citizens’ Thoughts About
Policy Issues: Effects on Content and Quantity, 26 POL. PSYCHOL. 929, 931 (2005).
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Democratic Self-Governance

Philosopher and educator Alexander Meiklejohn believed, as First
Amendment scholar Lucas Powe writes, “that freedom of speech is
protected because it is an essential aspect of self-governance.”263 Professor
Pierre J. Shlag concurs, asserting that Meiklejohn thought that “in a
democratic society, self-government is an important value and that political
or public speech is essential to self-government.”264
In Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government,265 Alexander
Meiklejohn wrote that in the “method of political self-government, the
point of ultimate interest is not the words of the speakers, but the minds of
the hearers.”266 In other words, people must have access to as much
information as possible to enable “the voting of wise decisions.”267
Few discussions today, of course, are as fraught with politics as those
involving the death penalty.268 Voters, in turn, hold the power to elect or
reject politicians based upon their stances toward the death penalty. As the
Washington Post noted in 2012, “the repeal of the death penalty is a mixed
bag for a politician with national aspirations.”269
Meiklejohnian theory, with its emphasis on making voters wise by
requiring “that everything worth saying shall be said,”270 is directly relevant
for supporting public access to details about the drugs, personnel, and
procedures used in lethal injections. For a state like Arizona to deny the
public access to these facts amounts to a government-sanctioned
“mutilation of the thinking process,”271 to borrow Meiklejohn’s fine phrase.
How so? By not having all of the facts regarding lethal injections—facts
already known to and possessed by the government, but now kept behind a
legal wall—citizens can neither think clearly nor vote wisely. Arizona
must prioritize “the minds of the hearers”272—the minds of its citizens, the
263. LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREEDOM OF THE
PRESS IN AMERICA 238 (1991).
264. Pierre J. Shlag, An Attack on Categorical Approaches to Freedom of Speech, 30 UCLA
L. REV. 671, 707 (1983).
265. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
(1948).
266. Id. at 25 (emphasis added).
267. Id.
268. See Pema Levy, An Unlikely Conservative Cause: Abolish the Death Penalty,
NEWSWEEK, May 23, 2014, at 1 (“[The Republican Party] is still squarely in the pro-deathpenalty camp. Ending capital punishment, which for years critics have argued disproportionately
affects minorities, is considered a liberal issue . . . [t]he Gallup poll [conducted in October 2013]
showed 81 percent of Republicans support it, versus 47 percent of Democrats.”).
269. John Wagner, Death Penalty Is at an ‘Impasse,’ WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 2012, at C1.
270. Meiklejohn, supra note 265, at 25.
271. Id. at 26.
272. Id. at 25.
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minds of its voters—above secrecy and paternalistically keeping them in
the dark. Voters need to be as knowledgeable as possible, having had the
opportunity to hear all relevant data on lethal injections, in order to reach
the best decision about a candidate who takes a public stance on the death
penalty and, in particular, how it should be carried out.
For instance, the Utah House of Representatives voted 39 to 34 in
February 2015 to bring back the firing squad as a method of execution if
the required drugs for a humane lethal injection are not available.273 The
deep divide among Utah’s lawmakers, as reflected by the 39-34 split,
demonstrates the contested political nature of death penalty procedures.
Utah citizens, in turn, may consider how their representatives voted on the
matter during the next election cycle. Concomitantly, to decide if death by
firing squad is really more humane than death by lethal injection, the public
must have access to as many facts as possible about the latter method of
death. In brief, then, death by lethal injection is a matter of public concern,
and voters must be provided with access to all relevant data that could
influence and affect how they vote on matters related thereto.
Meiklejohnian’s theory thus supports the creation of a First Amendment
right of access for the public to receive detailed information regarding
lethal injections.
C.

Self-Realization/Human Dignity

In addition to collectivist free speech goals such as discovering and
testing conceptions of the truth and enabling successful democratic selfgovernance, speech—both the right to speak and the right to receive
speech—can be inherently valuable to an individual. Indeed, “individual
self-fulfillment and participation in change are fundamental purposes of the
First Amendment,” according to the late Professor C. Edwin Baker of the
University of Pennsylvania Law School.274
Likewise, Thomas Emerson stressed that “freedom of expression is
essential as a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment.”275
Importantly, Emerson asserted that when the government acts “to cut off [a
person’s] search for the truth,” the government “elevate[s] society and the
state to a despotic command over him and place[s] him under the arbitrary
control of others.”276
Thus, when Arizona cuts off an inmate’s access to the truth about the
drugs, personnel, and procedures that will end his or her life, the
273. Erica Palmer, Firing Squad Bill Passes Utah House After Tough Debate, SALT LAKE
TRIBUNE, Feb. 13, 2015, at Politics.
274. Baker, supra note 261, at 51.
275. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6 (1970).
276. Id.
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government is depriving that inmate of the autonomy and ability to learn
and to realize precisely how he or she will die. In his concurrence in
Whitney v. California, Justice Louis Brandeis wrote that “those who won
our independence believed that the final end of the State was to make
men free to develop their faculties.”277 An inmate is denied the ability to
develop his faculties when the government thwarts his access to
information that affects how he will die. If not for the possible physical
pain one might endure, the mystery of what will happen during one’s last
moments could be interpreted as a psychological torture of the worst kind,
resulting in an abject failure to reach self-fulfillment. One ends life without
knowing precisely how it will be terminated. Devoid of the ability to pass
from this world with the grace of knowing oneself and one’s fate, human
dignity is stripped from the executed just like his or her life.
While the Arizona Department of Corrections in Wood may have had
its reasons for withholding procedural information, the government should
need to prove that these reasons are of a higher priority than one’s
autonomy and self-realization. The government must demonstrate that its
limitations on transparency are worth stripping away the remaining dignity
of fellow human beings in their final moments.
In summary, as Justice Brandeis wrote more than eighty-five years
ago in Whitney, the founders of the United States “eschewed silence
coerced by law.”278 States like Arizona in Wood and Georgia in Wellons
and Hill described in Part III engage in government-coerced silence about
lethal injection facts and procedures. They thwart, in Brandeis’s terms,
“the power of reason as applied through public discussion.”279
Ultimately, the marketplace of ideas theory requires the public be
supplied by states with detailed facts about lethal injections so that society
can attempt to know the truth about this method of death. The theory of
democratic self-governance, in turn, demands that voters have as much
information as possible about such procedures and personnel in order to
vote wisely in favor of or against politicians who support or condemn them.
They may also need that information to vote wisely on state referenda and
ballot initiatives related to the death penalty. And, finally, the theory of
self-realization requires that the condemned be informed of the facts about
their pending deaths so that they will understand and be able to mentally
confront exactly what it is that will end the liberty that is life.

277. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
278. Id. at 375–76.
279. Id. at 375.
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V. Conclusion
Debate rages today about access to detailed information regarding
lethal injections. For example, in February 2015 Virginia lawmakers
considered a bill under which executions in that state “would become
shrouded in unprecedented secrecy”280 by shielding the names of drug
manufacturers from public scrutiny. As the Washington Post reported,
“although the names and quantities of chemicals used would have to be
disclosed, the names of the companies that sell them and information about
buildings and equipment used in the process would be withheld.”281
In the face of such measures, this article made the case that, regardless
of the doctrinal problems of access under the Press-Enterprise II test
experienced in the trio of 2014 cases examined in the Introduction and Part
II, First Amendment theory demands public and inmate access to details
about the drugs, procedures, and personnel involved in lethal-injection
executions.
As addressed in Part II, the experience and logic test from PressEnterprise II typically dictates the public’s access rights to governmental
proceedings, including executions.282
This test requires judicial
examination, first, of whether a process has been historically open, and
second, whether access plays a “significant positive role” in the functioning
of that process.283 At first glance, the right of access to information about
lethal-injection drugs and the right of access to view executions, which was
recognized by the Ninth Circuit both in California First Amendment
Coalition v. Woodford284 and Associated Press v. Otter,285 seem similar
enough that the history/experience and logic test should apply equally to
both situations. However, the test suffers from several flaws.
In particular, satisfying the experience and logic test creates only a
qualified right of access that courts have been unable to clearly define.286
Thus, the application of the test has been, at best, mishandled and, at worst,
ignored.287 This lack of precedent has placed immeasurable discretion in
the hands of district court judges who are given the ability to decide what is
“good” or “desirable” instead of what is “constitutionally commanded by
280. Rachel Weiner, Va. Bill Calls for Secrecy on Lethal Injections, WASH. POST, Feb. 6,
2015, at A1.
281. Id.
282. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1986).
283. Id.
284. 299 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002).
285. 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 12128 (9th Cir. June 8, 2012). See supra notes 103-06
(addressing both Woodford and Otter).
286. Supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
287. Id.
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the First Amendment.”288 Because of this unbridled discretion, case law
applying the history/experience and logic test is subjective and
inconsistent, and ranges from access to criminal trials to attendance at wild
horse gathers.289
Application of the experience and logic test is inconsistent even within
the single context of access to information about lethal injections. For
instance, in 2014 in Wood v. Ryan, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit interpreted the experience prong of the test broadly.290 It reasoned
that hangings and details about gas chambers were historically open to the
public, and information about lethal-injection drugs were “inextricably
intertwined” with the execution itself.291 Based on this, the court found a
tradition of access to executions that conclusively extended to data about
lethal injections. It further held that a series of botched executions that
year justified a “more-information-the-better” approach.292
In stark contrast, both the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit and the Supreme Court of Georgia applied the same test as Wood,
during the same year as Wood, but reached dramatically different
conclusions with fatal results. In Wellons v. Commissioner, the Eleventh
Circuit failed to directly address the inmate’s arguments under the
experience and logic test, and instead held merely that the First
Amendment does not afford an inmate “the broad right to know” detailed
information about his lethal injection.293
In Owens v. Hill, the Georgia court relied on the interest of privacy to
hold that it was in the best interest of the personnel involved in lethal
injections to keep the information from public view.294 Only the
concurrence and dissent in Wellons and Owens, respectively, highlighted
the hypocrisy of the two courts in simultaneously requiring an inmate to
bring specific Eighth Amendment claims while denying that inmate access
to the details involved in those claims.295 The U.S. Supreme Court has not
considered the rulings in Wellons or Hill, and it vacated the Ninth Circuit’s
holding in Wood without addressing the First Amendment access
arguments, thus leaving application of the experience and logic test
ambiguous.296
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Id. at 1085–86.
754 F.3d 1260, 1267 (11th Cir. 2014).
295 Ga. 302, 316–17 (Ga. 2014).
Wellons, 754 F.3d at 1267–68; Owens, 295 Ga. at 318.
Ryan v. Wood, 135 S. Ct. 21 (2014).

2015

ACCESS TO INFORMATION ABOUT LETHAL INJECTIONS

37

As mentioned in this article’s Introduction, public opinion about death
by lethal injection is in a state of instability.297 Public support for the death
penalty has dropped by nearly twenty percent in just as many years, and the
American Board of Anesthesiology has explicitly removed itself from
involvement in the lethal-injection process.298 As a result, the safety of
lethal-injection procedures is in decline.299 Despite the horrific tales of
Joseph Wood and Clayton Lockett—who gasped for air and suffered
gruesomely before their drug cocktails took effect300—the vibrant and
volatile debate about lethal injection itself implicates a trio of First
Amendment theories.
John Stuart Mill and the marketplace theory are famous for the
proposition that “the only way in which a human being can approach to
knowing the whole of a subject is by hearing what can be said about it by
persons of every variation of opinion.”301 The marketplace thrives on an
abundance of information through which the public can sort and sift in an
effort to attain truth about a topic, like lethal injections. Only by wading
through a flourishing marketplace of ideas can the public truly engage in
robust, accurate, and fair discussions about the humanity of lethal
injections.
Similarly, only by possessing access to this abundance of information
can the public reach an informed opinion, allowing it to participate in “the
voting of wise decisions” as they exercise self-governance.302 The
democratic self-governance theory asserts that political or public debate is
essential to self-government.303 In the context of lethal injections, educated
public debate about lethal injections is necessary for the public to remain
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Fallin’s motion to dismiss an open records request for documents relating to Lockett’s execution.
Adam Marshall, Oklahoma Supreme Court Unanimously Rejects Effort to Halt Public Records
Lawsuit for Execution Records, REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (June 11,
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wise and informed when voting to elect representatives who have certain
stances on the death penalty.
Finally, the self-realization/human dignity theory posits that freedom
of speech and expression are “essential as a means of assuring” man’s
ultimate goal—“individual self-fulfillment.”304 This theory reflects the
importance of access to information about lethal injections, particularly for
the inmate himself. When the government restricts access to information
about an impending lethal injection—especially in the wake of so many
botched executions in 2014 alone—the government is effectively depriving
an inmate of the ability to realize and understand his own death.
These theories, coupled with the sorry state of the experience and
logic test, demand a reexamination of the First Amendment access doctrine
as it relates to lethal-injection drugs, personnel, and procedures. The U.S.
Supreme Court should grant certiorari in a future death-by-lethal-injection
case in order to untie the knot created by a misapplication of the experience
and logic test. Like the Ninth Circuit in Wood, the Court must move
beyond the narrow barriers of the test to recognize that current public
debate and First Amendment theory support—even require—access to
detailed information about lethal injections.

304. BAKER, supra note 261, at 51.

